Up to three vaults, side by side

Pick up to three families. The table is not a score: an EAL authenticator is not “safer” than an open MCU if your threat is the vendor, and the reverse is true if your threat is a lab.

Selection (3/3)

Ledger

Vendor-OS SE

Contract: Vendor-OS SE
Silicon class: Vendor-OS SE
Who programs the silicon: Vendor-signed firmware
What you verify: Vendor binary + attestation
Chips: STMicro ST33 (BOLOS), Common Criteria EAL5+ / EAL6+
Application firmware: Partial
Hardware schematics: Closed
Assets: Multi-coin
Air-gap: No
Two distinct chips: No
Passphrase: Yes
Connection: usb, bluetooth
Screen: Compact OLED (Nano) or touch e-ink (Flex, Stax)
Best for: Multi-coin beginners, daily use, resistance to physical theft.
Main limit: Vendor trust model + closed SE OS. Bluetooth and USB widen the surface. Recover is optional; programmability of the ST33 is not.

Trezor Safe 7

Open MCU, opaque silicon

Contract: Open MCU, opaque silicon
Silicon class: Open-RTL SE
Who programs the silicon: Publishable SE firmware
What you verify: Reproducible MCU builds
Chips: TROPIC01 (open RTL, SE firmware to be signed) + OPTIGA Trust M + STM32U5
Application firmware: Open source
Hardware schematics: Closed
Assets: Multi-coin
Air-gap: No
Two distinct chips: Yes
Passphrase: Yes
Connection: usb
Screen: Color touchscreen
Best for: Physical theft / seizure, defense in depth, users who want the “new school” Trezor.
Main limit: Donjon 2026: laser fault, unsigned TROPIC01 firmware possible in lab. No impact on funds according to Trezor, thanks to the other layers. Price, youth, and the die is not the RTL.

Coldcard

Open MCU, opaque silicon

Contract: Open MCU, opaque silicon
Silicon class: Fixed-instruction authenticator
Who programs the silicon: ROM / frozen instruction set
What you verify: Reproducible MCU builds
Chips: ATECC608 (Microchip) + DS28C36B (Maxim) — authenticators, fixed instruction set
Application firmware: Open source
Hardware schematics: Closed
Assets: Bitcoin only
Air-gap: Yes
Two distinct chips: Yes
Passphrase: Yes
Connection: airgap
Screen: OLED (Mk) or large e-ink + camera (Q)
Best for: Large Bitcoin amounts, air-gap, technical users, a key in a multisig.
Main limit: Entropy bug 2021–2026: migrate any seed without dice on affected firmware. Demanding UX. Bitcoin only. The two chips are not ST33s.

Criterion	Ledger Vendor-OS SE	Trezor Safe 7 Open MCU, opaque silicon	Coldcard Open MCU, opaque silicon
Contract	Vendor-OS SE	Open MCU, opaque silicon	Open MCU, opaque silicon
Silicon class	Vendor-OS SE	Open-RTL SE	Fixed-instruction authenticator
Who programs the silicon	Vendor-signed firmware	Publishable SE firmware	ROM / frozen instruction set
What you verify	Vendor binary + attestation	Reproducible MCU builds	Reproducible MCU builds
Chips	STMicro ST33 (BOLOS), Common Criteria EAL5+ / EAL6+	TROPIC01 (open RTL, SE firmware to be signed) + OPTIGA Trust M + STM32U5	ATECC608 (Microchip) + DS28C36B (Maxim) — authenticators, fixed instruction set
Application firmware	Partial	Open source	Open source
Hardware schematics	Closed	Closed	Closed
Assets	Multi-coin	Multi-coin	Bitcoin only
Air-gap	No	No	Yes
Two distinct chips	No	Yes	Yes
Passphrase	Yes	Yes	Yes
Connection	usb, bluetooth	usb	airgap
Screen	Compact OLED (Nano) or touch e-ink (Flex, Stax)	Color touchscreen	OLED (Mk) or large e-ink + camera (Q)
Best for	Multi-coin beginners, daily use, resistance to physical theft.	Physical theft / seizure, defense in depth, users who want the “new school” Trezor.	Large Bitcoin amounts, air-gap, technical users, a key in a multisig.
Main limit	Vendor trust model + closed SE OS. Bluetooth and USB widen the surface. Recover is optional; programmability of the ST33 is not.	Donjon 2026: laser fault, unsigned TROPIC01 firmware possible in lab. No impact on funds according to Trezor, thanks to the other layers. Price, youth, and the die is not the RTL.	Entropy bug 2021–2026: migrate any seed without dice on affected firmware. Demanding UX. Bitcoin only. The two chips are not ST33s.