Entropy at birth
A defective firmware can produce seeds that are too weak. Two authenticators change nothing if the secret was born too small. Dice are not folklore.
The trust model, not the brand.
Hardware wallets differ by what the silicon can do, and by what you can measure on the unit — not by a “SE” or “open source” checkbox. An authenticator is not a smartcard. A GitHub repository is not the device’s flash. There is no universally safest type: it depends on what you fear, and on who is allowed to load code onto it.
- 01What “SE”, smartcard and authenticator actually mean.
- 0215 device families, with limits — not just marketing claims.
- 03Attack vectors, incidents (Kraken 2020, Recover 2023, TROPIC01 and Coldcard 2026).
- 04Passphrases, the so-called “25th word”, and a demystification of Ledger Recover.
Six silicon contracts, not six trophies
Read the briefVendor-OS secure element
A certified computer whose manufacturer signs the code
Open application firmware, opaque silicon
The MCU can be read; the chip beside it, almost never
JavaCard / smartcard
A real applet card, not an ATECC in bank clothing
Published schematics, unit still unproven
The documentary maximum, not proof that your specimen matches
MCU only
Everything is readable; the silicon was not designed to hide a secret
Stateless / DIY
No persistent secret; the vault is the plate
Choose by threat
Five questions. A shortlist, not a universal ranking.
Four truths the screen will not tell you
The seed is the real vault
The dongle does not protect a phrase that was photographed, phished, or typed into fake support. Nobody ever asks you for it.
Multi-vendor multisig
A 2-of-3 with three different brands remains the best defence against a single manufacturer’s failure — bug, bankruptcy, or update.
The purchase channel
Manufacturer or official reseller only, attestation on first connect, passphrase, steel backup. The rest is theatre.
What has already broken
All vectors2020Kraken Security Labs vs Trezor One / Model TAn off-the-shelf MCU, even PIN-encrypted, is not a vault against an equipped attacker. That is the reason for SEs on Trezor Safe.2020Ledger customer database leakThe hardware wallet does not protect your buyer identity. A marketing file is worth a lifetime social-engineering campaign.2023Ledger Recover — controversy, not a hack“The SE cannot extract the seed” was a slogan. “The SE only extracts it if a function authorizes it” is the reality of a chip you cannot audit.2026Donjon: laser on TROPIC01An “auditable” SE remains an attackable SE. Defense in depth is not a slogan if the second and third layers actually hold.
Seed, passphrase, 25th word
BIP39 is not a password. The passphrase is not a word from the wordlist. Forget it and the funds burn with no appeal. We separate the marketing from the mechanism.
Ledger Recover, without slogans
Shamir 2-of-3, three custodians, KYC, a paid option. It is not “Ledger has your seed”. It is not an unopenable capsule either. The protocol, the anger, and the alternatives.